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Abstract 
 
 
Land is of prime importance for all the activities of human beings, and how to efficiently use 
the limited land resource has been a crucial issue ever since the earliest times of human 
society. Uncertainty and irreversibility are important issues related to land use change, and it 
has been shown by Mäler and Fisher (2005, p590-p592) that the replacement of stochastic 
variable by its expected value could result in inappropriate land use decisions.  
 
Based on the two-period framework of Mäler and Fisher (2005, p590-p592), this study 
introduces two kinds of discounting schemes, standard exponential discounting and 
hyperbolic discounting, to their analysis. Hyperbolic discounting is demonstrated by many 
researches and it can decently illustrate individuals’ time-inconsistent preferences toward 
future payoffs. The decision rules about land use under both exponential discounting and 
hyperbolic discounting are illustrated and compared in this thesis.  
 
The results have shown that, under hyperbolic discounting, when an immediate reward is 
generated by converting the land for development, the land will be converted earlier than 
under standard exponential discounting. In contrast, when an immediate cost is entailed to 
land conversion, the land will be converted later under hyperbolic discounting.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
Land, as one of the most important natural resources, plays a crucial role in the prosperity 
and development of human society. As a necessity, land is required for almost all kinds 
of activities of human beings. For instance, land is a necessary factor for agricultural 
production; landscape in terms of forest preserves biodiversity; human settlement and 
industrial production also need land as a basis for these activities (Anthony Young, 1998).  
 
Land based agricultural production, such as growing crops, grazing of livestock, 
vegetable and fruit plantation, not only provides job opportunities for the local residents, 
but also contributes to the vast majority of human food supplies. According to a study 
from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), during 1990-
92 to 2010-12, the total number of people that suffer from hunger has been reduced by 
132 million, which is around 6.1 % of the total population all over the world (FAO 
report, 2012). The growth of agricultural production, particularly the boost in crop yields, 
is the main reason for the decline in hunger in the past decades.  
  
Another important purpose for the use of land is for forestry. Forests not only provide a 
diverse range of resources, like fuel woods and timber for human beings, but also 
function as habitats for most terrestrial organisms. It is reported that 90% of the world’s 
terrestrial biodiversity, both animal and plant species, is contained by the forests (Living 
Planet Report 2010, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)). In addition, forests help to 
assimilate carbon dioxide, regulate the hydrological cycles, purify water, reduce soil 
erosion, and mitigate natural hazards such as landslides. 
 
Land used for human settlements, such as houses, roads, parks and factories, occupies a 
large proportion of the whole land as well. With more people migrating to and settling in 
cities, the demand for urban land used for residential construction, public institutions like 
schools and hospitals, parks and urban green land for recreation and transportation will 
increase. All forms of human settlements depend on the use of land for these activities 
(Anthony Young, 1998).  
 
In addition to these main purposes for land use such as food production, biodiversity 
conservation and urban development, land also plays an important role in terms of other 
functions like disposal of waste from human settlements, storage of water and mineral 
resources, and preserving both natural and historical sites (Anthony Young, 1998). 
 
Land is of essential importance for human beings. Given the limited amount of land that 
is available all over the world and the ever-increasing population which puts pressure on 
the scarcity of land, special attention should be paid to the rational and appropriate use of 
land.  
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1.1 Problem background 
 
 
Ever since the earliest times, changing the use of land has been an important way to fulfil 
human beings’ demand for food and other necessities of life. Dating back to hundreds of 
years ago in the developed countries, and even recently in the tropical areas such as 
Brazil, Indonesia and Malaysia, a large amount of natural forests has been clear-cut and 
converted to agricultural land. It is the cultivation of land that has solved problems such 
as food shortages and demand for fuel woods. Another example could be the recent 
conversion from rural land to urban construction. With this trend towards urbanization in 
the developing countries, extensive expansion of cities has involved a large amount of 
land conversion especially in peri-urban areas. There are four issues closely related to this 
change in land use: competitiveness, irreversibility, uncertainty and discounting.  
 
First of all, in most cases, there is a competition for land among different uses. That is, 
the same plot of land can be used only for one purpose during a certain period. Farming 
land, for instance, can be converted for a planned new highway. However, growing crops 
is no longer possible on the same plot of land any more. The clearance of a natural forest 
can be used for agricultural cultivation; however, the forest does not exist any longer. 
Therefore, when the land use is changed for one purpose, simultaneously, the possibility 
to use the land for another purpose is reduced.  
 
Secondly, the land use change, or equivalently, the conversion of land, could be 
irreversible. In fact, the process of changing the use of land from its original state to 
human settlement, agricultural and industrial production has already resulted in a large 
amount of loss in biodiversity and other forms of environmental deterioration. The 
economic benefits of biodiversity could be potentially huge, and the costs of biodiversity 
loss and environmental deterioration could be the degradation or even collapse of 
nature’s ecosystem. This in turn will threaten the well-being of humans, who closely rely 
on various kinds of services provided by the ecosystem. Therefore, once the land is 
converted, it will be rather costly and even environmentally impossible to reverse.  
 
Thirdly, the changing of land use is usually risky. That is, when future outcomes for the 
land use are not known with certainty, possible states or outcomes of future land use 
should be taken into account for the optimal decision about the land use. Take the case of 
farming land for an example. Assume that the farming land is currently used for the 
purpose of growing wheat and the landowner is planning to convert this land for 
vegetable plantation. However, due to uncertain demand, the market price of vegetables 
could drastically decline or increase. And then, the future revenues from this new use of 
land are uncertain. Clearly, the future cannot be known with certainty. However, one 
thing of great importance is to take into account all the possible future outcomes when 
making decisions about land use changes. 
 
Last but not least, as long as the land will be used for a certain purpose for several 
periods of time, an appropriate discount rate should be chosen to facilitate the Decision 
Maker (DM) to compare the different uses of land. In economics, discounting is used to 
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compare an individual’s preference of rewards at different points in time. Generally, in 
consideration of two similar rewards, individuals have a tendency to prefer the earlier 
reward than the later. Standard exponential discounting, which was introduced by 
Samuelson (1937), is traditionally used to illustrate this tendency. However, recent 
studies (for instance, Loewenstein and Thaler (1989), Loewenstein and Prelec (1992)) 
have shown a wide range of anomalies that challenged the core assumption of 
exponential discounting, i.e. time consistency. A new hypothesis, hyperbolic discounting, 
which is a revised mathematical model based on exponential discounting, has been 
observed and demonstrated by many studies (Frederick et al. (2002), Matthew J. Salois 
and Moss (2011)). 
 
All in all, competitiveness between different land uses, irreversible conversion of land, 
uncertain future outcomes from land use change and adopting the right discount rate are 
important issues related to land use change. The optimal land use decision should take 
into account all four of these aspects. 
 
 
1.2 Problem  
 
 
With respect to issues about irreversibility and uncertainty for the land use change, more 
specifically in the context of commercial development of a preserved natural area, it was 
initially discussed by Arrow and Fisher (1974), and later set out by Mäler and Fisher 
(2005). They highlighted the irreversible effect of destroying a natural area, emphasized 
the intertemporal resolution of uncertainty, and concentrated on the intertemporal 
perspective of a decision about the development of the land. It was shown that, with the 
prospect of complete information which would resolve the uncertainty in the future, 
decision for current commercial development would be less likely to occur. The intuition 
behind the result was apparent: the prospect of complete information would motivate the 
DM to stay flexible in the future, and then making the best decision by taking advantage 
of the forthcoming information. The intertemporal resolution of uncertainty would also 
prevent the adoption of an irreversible decision now, i.e. commercial development, which 
would limit the DM’s options in the future. 
 
However, instead of choosing an appropriate discount rate, future benefits were treated as 
present values for their analysis (Arrow and Fisher 1974, Mäler and Fisher 2005). In this 
study, a discounting function will be introduced to the analysis proposed by Mäler and 
Fisher (2005). The study will compare the optimal land use decisions under different 
discounting schemes, standard exponential discounting and hyperbolic discounting.  
 
On the one hand, comparing to the standard exponential discounting, which is 
characterized by a constant discount rate, hyperbolic discounting implies a declining 
discount rate over time. The DM under hyperbolic discounting tends to grab instant 
benefits or postpone the corresponding cost at the moment. That is, the hyperbolic 
discounting is more present-biased than the exponential discounting and cares more about 
present outcomes than future outcomes. On the other hand, the option of behaving 
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optimally by delaying the decision about the development of the land should also be 
considered. The reason is that with the prospect of available information, the uncertainty 
will be reduced by simply waiting. As long as the land is maintained in an undeveloped 
situation, it is always available for the DM to use further information and make the 
optimal decision in the future. On the contrary, once the land is developed, the DM will 
be locked into development, and any future information does not contain economic value 
any more.  
  
Given the prospect of behaving optimally by delaying development and the desire to 
obtain instantaneous benefits from present development, which is characterized by 
hyperbolic discounting, the DM will engage in an intertemporal tussle as to the 
development decision. The effect of hyperbolic discounting pushes the DM to take up the 
immediate payoffs by developing the land, while the option of postponement encourages 
the DM to wait patiently to see what will happen in the future. Therefore, in order to 
investigate the net effect of hyperbolic discounting and the option of postponement, in 
this thesis, a two-period framework, which consists of a first period and a single second 
period, will be constructed to explore the decision rules and results under hyperbolic 
discounting.  
 
 
1.3 Aim 
 
 
The aim of this study is to analyse the optimal land use decision under uncertainty and 
hyperbolic discounting. A two-period framework will be constructed to illustrate the 
effect of hyperbolic discounting: 
 
In this two-period framework, the DM has the flexibility to make a land use change 
decision at the beginning of the first period or postpone the decision to the beginning of 
the second period. Decision rules and results under the standard exponential discounting 
and hyperbolic discounting will be analyzed. This two-period framework aims to figure 
out the following three aspects: 
 
1) Comparison of decision rules under exponential and hyperbolic discounting; 
2) Interpretation of the economical insights of the land use decisions under 
exponential and hyperbolic discounting; and 
3) Sensitivity analysis of the corresponding parameters under hyperbolic discounting. 
 
 
1.4 Outline of the study  
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, this thesis includes six sections.  
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Figure 1. Illustration of the outline of the study 
 
 
Chapter 1 gives an introduction about problem background, research questions and 
objectives of this study. A brief outline of this thesis is present in this section as well. 
 
Chapter 2 provides the theory underpinning of this thesis. Theory about option value, 
quasi-option value in the context of irreversible development of land and uncertainty, 
theory about exponential discounting, time-inconsistent preferences and hyperbolic 
discounting are covered in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 3 presents the research method used in this study, unit of study and delimitation 
are also highlighted in this chapter.  
 
The model used for analysing optimal land use decision under uncertainty and hyperbolic 
discounting is provided in Chapter 4.  Besides, optimal decisions about land use under 
different discounting schemes, exponential discounting and hyperbolic discounting, are 
also discussed and compared in Chapter 4.  
 
Chapter 5 focuses on the analysis and discussion about the optimal decision about land 
use. The sensitivity analyses of corresponding variables, such as the discount rate and the 
probability are illustrated. 
 
The last chapter presents the conclusions of this dissertation. Recommendations and 
suggestions for future research in this field are also provided in this chapter.  
Theoretical perspective 
and literature review  
Introduction 
Method 
Model setting and decisions 
Analysis and discussion  
Conclusion and 
recommendations 
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2 Theoretical perspective and literature review 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide theoretical underpinnings for this study. This 
chapter reviews the theory of option value in the context of environmental economics. 
Literatures about intertemporal choice, exponential discounting, time-inconsistent 
preferences and hyperbolic discounting will be covered as well. This chapter concludes 
with the implication for this study, where the importance of this research is highlighted. 
 
 
2.1 Option value in the context of environmental economics 
 
 
The concept of option value was first discussed by Weisbrod (1964) in a context of 
uncertain demand for a national park, which might be closed. It was mentioned that if it 
was closed, no amenity services would be provided for any visitors. He argued that 
visitors here contained both current visitors and future potential visitors to the park. 
Therefore, in order to measure the benefit of keeping the park open, it was not 
appropriate to use only compensating consumer surplus to current visitors. The benefit to 
future potential visitors should be included to the benefit of preserving the park as well. 
According to Weisbrod, these potential visitors would pay certain amount of money to 
keep the option of visiting the park in the future, and the value attached to this future 
availability was denoted “option value”. 
 
As mentioned by Krutilla (1967, p780), “option demand was characterized as a 
willingness to pay for retaining an option to use an area or facility that would be difficult 
or impossible to replace and for which no close substitute was available. Moreover, such 
a demand might exist even though there was no current intention to use the area or 
facility in question and this option might never be exercised”. He concluded that, an 
“option demand” or “option value” for preservation should be considered for an efficient 
allocation of resources.  
 
Cicchetti and Freeman (1971) have shown that, the option value defined by Weisbrod 
(1964) would always be positive for a risk-averse individual. They concluded that the 
option value, which could be referred to as an extra benefit, was actually similar to a risk 
aversion premium. In their analysis, it was pointed out that only the expected value of 
individual’s compensating surplus would underestimate the preservation benefit of 
keeping the natural park open. The underlying reason was that risk-averse individuals 
would like to pay a premium to avoid the risk of losing the possibility to visit the park.  
  
The brief idea of option value was actually that individuals would be willing to pay more 
money than the expected consumers’ surplus in order to secure the option of visiting the 
park in the future. However, some controversy was triggered for the precise definition 
and measure of this option value. Schmalensee (1972) argued that option value might be 
either positive or negative and the expected consumer surplus should be the best available 
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estimation of option prices in the presence of uncertainty and risk aversion. He also 
pointed out that the benefit would be either underestimated or overestimated with this 
approximation, but no better estimation could be available. Bohm (1975) did agree with 
Schmalensee’s result about the sign of option values in the context of uncertain future 
preferences and risk aversion. However, he also pointed out that the estimation for 
expected consumers’ surplus was as difficult as the estimation for option prices. The 
research result of Graham (1981) has shown that it was better to use option price as a 
measure of benefit in the case of similar individuals and collective risk, on the contrary, 
expected consumer surplus was a better measure of benefit in case of similar individuals 
and personal risks. 
 
Another challenge to the option value analysed by Cicchetti and Freeman (1971) was the 
research provided by Arrow and Lind (1970). Arrow and Lind (1970) have shown that 
when the risk of an investment was undertaken by an increasing amount of individuals, 
the aggregate risk premiums of all individuals tended to be zero. Thus, the most 
important criterion for evaluating a project was the expected return to the investment.  
 
Arrow and Fisher (1974) focused on the intertemporal perspective of decision making 
about the development of a preserved natural area. This natural area also provided 
amenity services under the purpose of preservation. Given the assumptions that this 
commercial development would result in a perpetuity loss from preservation, and 
forthcoming information would reduce the uncertainty about future benefits from both 
development and preservation, less amount of land should be converted for development 
in the first period. The core task of this research was checking the effect of introducing 
stochastic costs and benefits instead of using expected values of these random variables. 
They argued that even where it was not appropriate to assume risk aversion, the 
irreversibility of a development could lead to an effect similar with risk aversion. 
 
Henry (1974a, p 1006) defined an “irreversible decision” in this way, “a decision is 
considered irreversible if it significantly reduces for a long time the variety of choices 
that would be possible in the future”. He discussed the effect of irreversibility in the 
context of a proposed project about building a new highway around Paris which might 
destroy public parks and historical sites. It was mentioned in his discussion that the 
uncertain benefits or costs involved in a project were usually displaced by their expected 
values. That is, a riskless problem was used as a substitution for the original stochastic 
problem. He pointed out that an irreversible decision would always be favoured by this 
substitution, and the size of “irreversibility effect” played an important role in the process 
of decision making.  
 
Henry (1974b) pointed out that Cicchetti and Freeman (1971) and Arrow and Fisher 
(1974) had shown two kinds of interpretations for the concept of “option value”. In his 
research, Henry focused on the effect of complete information in the decision-making 
process. The result showed that the preservation of a historical site or natural area would 
always be favoured, even little prospect of complete information would be available. In 
other words, given a mere possibility of obtaining complete information and the 
irreversibility of development, a positive option value would be generated by preserving 
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the historical site or natural area. This was just the “irreversibility effect” which was 
mentioned by Henry (1974a). 
 
As mentioned above, two interpretations of Weisbrod's option value have arisen 
(Hanemann 1989). The first, presented by Cicchetti and Freeman (1971), and further 
refined by Schmalensee (1972), Bohm (1975) and Graham (1981), have shown that 
option value was similar to a risk premium that many consumers would be willing to pay 
to preserve the park for future visit. They argued that this option value should be taken 
into account in social benefit-cost analysis for the project of closing the natural park. The 
second interpretation, presented by Arrow and Fisher (1974), and Henry (1974a, 1974b), 
focused on the irreversibility of closing the park and the intertemporal decision with 
prospect of complete information about future benefits. The later interpretation of option 
value was also referred to as Arrow-Fisher-henry (AFH) option value, or quasi-option 
value in the literature.   
 
Freeman (1984) pointed out that the quasi-option value was in fact a neutral concept. 
Neither preservation nor development would be preferred in the presence of a quasi-
option value. The existence of quasi-option value and its sign largely relied on the nature 
of uncertainty, the possibility of obtaining information and structure of the decision 
problem. With respect to the challenge from Freeman (1984) and Miller and Lad (1984), 
who also argued that development decisions involving a quasi-option were not 
necessarily more conservative than decisions without the quasi-option. Fisher and 
Hanemann (1987) claimed that the quasi-option value would never be negative, but the 
net benefit from preservation could be either positive or negative. Besides, it was proved 
by Fisher and Hanemann, when the uncertainty mainly came from the benefits of 
development, decision would favour for development; when the uncertainty was 
primarily about the benefits of preservation, decision of postponing irreversible 
development would be favoured.    
 
Hanemann (1989) claimed that the irreversibility of development has led to such a 
situation: in case of preservation in the initial period, it was always possible to make the 
best decision later according to the subsequent information about future benefits of 
development and preservation; in case of development in the initial period, it was not 
available to change the initial decision and the further information available was actually 
meaningless. He concluded that the AFH option value, or the quasi-option value, was the 
value of flexible decision in the future.  
 
Recently, a bunch of research about the irreversible development of an environmental 
resource have relied on the real option approach proposed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
With the arisen concern about the relationship between this real option and the option 
value developed in the context of environmental economics, Fisher (2000) proved that 
they were actually equivalent. 
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2.2 Intertemporal choice and exponential discounting 
 
 
Intertemporal choice is the study of how individuals evaluate costs and benefits at 
different points in time and make decisions that also influence their choices in the future 
(Berns et al. 2007). The discounted utility (DU) model, which was introduced by 
Samuelson (1937), is used as a standard economic method to compare trade-offs between 
costs and benefits at different points in time. As stated by Frederick et al. (2002), the 
most important reasons why DU model is so popular for analysing intertemporal 
decisions is its simplicity and similarity with the compound interest formula. That is, the 
DU model assumes that individuals evaluate the costs and benefits of a decision in a 
similar way that financial market evaluates monetary gains and losses. Future costs and 
benefits are all exponentially discounted in accordance with how delayed they are over a 
time horizon. The most important assumption of the DU model is that intertemporal 
preferences of an individual can be characterize by a single, constant discount rate.  
 
Given a discount function 𝑓(𝜏), the instantaneous discount rate at time 𝜏 is defined as 
−
𝑓′(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏)   (Laibson 1997). In particular, if the discount function takes the form 𝐷𝑡 = � 11+𝜌�𝑡. 
The instantaneous discount rate at time 𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝜌𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡−𝐷𝑡+1𝐷𝑡+1 = 𝜌 . That is, 𝜌  is the 
instantaneous discount rate for all periods in a DU model. Constant discounting describes 
how an individual evaluate payoffs at different points in time. It means that putting off or 
bringing forward two payoffs should not change individual’s preference toward the 
payoffs. Take the opportunity of an investment as an example, if it is optimal to make the 
investment now, it should also be optimal to make the investment in any time in the 
future. The assumption of constant discounting allows a person’s time preference to be 
compressed into a single discount rate. If constant discounting does not hold, an entire 
discount function should be specified in order to characterize an individual’s time 
preferences.  
 
As shown in Koopmans' (1960) axiomatic derivation of the DU model (with exponential 
discounting), the postulate of stationarity was the reason for a constant discount rate. 
Even though neither Samuelson nor Koopmans recommended the DU model as a 
normative model for intertemporal choice, the simple DU model was widely adopted by 
economists. It was used as the framework to analyse intertemporal decisions. According 
to the DU model, the only difference between intertemporal choice and other types of 
choices is that, some consequences under intertemporal choice are delayed, and hence 
they must be discounted. Therefore, many researches in the field of intertemporal choices 
have focused on choosing an appropriate discount rate.  
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2.3 Time-inconsistent preference and hyperbolic discounting  
 
 
Strotz (1956) first pointed out that individuals tended to be more impatient when they 
compared short-run payoffs than when they compared long-run payoffs. He suggested 
that, at different points of time, different discount rates should be employed to illustrate 
individuals’ time-inconsistent preferences. Strotz did not propose any specific 
mathematical form for the phenomenon of time-inconsistent preference, however, he did 
draw attention to the case of declining discount rates. Later studies on time preferences 
have actually supported his result. Numerous experiments with animals, notably pigeons, 
have shown that animals discounted the future rewards in a non-exponential manner. For 
example, the research of Rachlin and Green (1972) indicated that, when provided with a 
choice between a small immediate reward (2-sec exposure to grain) and a large reward (f 
exposure to grain) four seconds later, pigeons always preferred the small, immediate 
reward. However, when this choice was postponed T seconds, pigeons would make 
choices according to the delayed time T. When T was short, pigeons chose the small 
immediate reward. When T was long, pigeons only chose the large delayed reward. 
Ainslie (1975) suggested that impulsiveness appeared to be the reason of employing   
hyperbolic curves to illustrate the decline of rewards over the course of time. 
 
Researches about humans also suggested the same time-inconsistent preferences. An 
example given by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) has showed that: when provided with a 
choice between doing seven hours of unpleasant task on the first of April and eight hours 
on the 15th of April, individuals would always prefer seven hours on the first of April if 
they were asked on the first of February. However, when the first of April came, given 
the same choice, most of individuals would prefer to put off the unpleasant task to the 
15th of April. As mentioned by Berns et al. (2007), most humans did concern about, or at 
least be able to take into account costs and benefits at different points in time. On the 
contrary, research by Stevens et al. (2005) has shown that the closest evolutionary 
relatives of humankind, cotton-top tamarin monkeys, would always choose an immediate 
food reward rather than waiting eight seconds for a triple reward.  
 
Time-inconsistent preference, that is, individuals are more impatient in the short run than 
in the long run, is often referred to as present biased preferences (O’Donoghue and Rabin 
1999). This preference is well described by a hyperbolic discounting function. 
Hyperbolic discounting functions decline at a fast rate in the short run and decrease at a 
slow rate in the long run.  Therefore, a hyperbolic discounter is more impatient when 
compare short-run payoffs than when comparing long-run payoffs. 
 
The first formal model about hyperbolic discounting was introduced by Chung and 
Herrnstein (1967). According to their experimental research about pigeons, the 
mathematical form of 𝐷(𝑡) = 1/𝑡 was used as the discounting function to describe the 
behaviour of pigeons. The general hyperbolic discounting function was developed by 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). They adopted a generalized hyperbola, 
 
 D(𝑡) = (1 + 𝛼𝑡)−𝛽𝛼 ,𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝛼,𝛽 > 0,  (2.3.1) 
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where the level of deviation from exponential discounting was determined by the 
parameter 𝛼. In the limiting case, when 𝛼 approached to zero, this hyperbolic discount 
function became 𝐷(𝑡) = 𝑒−𝛽𝑡. And it is the same as exponential discounting. 
  
Phelps and Pollak (1968) originally took a discount function of the form  
 
 𝐷(𝑡) = �1,        𝑖𝑓 𝑡 = 0
𝛽𝛿𝑡,    𝑖𝑓 𝑡 > 0 , where 0 < 𝛽 < 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 < 𝛿 < 1, (2.3.2) 
 
to discuss intergenerational altruism. This discount function is often referred to as quasi-
hyperbolic discounting. In a quasi-hyperbolic discount function, the discount factor 𝛿 
reflected individual’s time preference. While the constant factor 𝛽, applied equally to 
each period t, implies that the discount factor between current period and the next is 
lower than the discount factor in later periods. Therefore, 𝛽 could be interpreted as a 
measure of individuals’ present bias. When 𝛽 = 1, the quasi-hyperbolic discount function 
is simply the exponential one. Quasi-hyperbolic discount function, with a discrete time 
function structure {1,𝛽𝛿,𝛽𝛿2, … }, is often referred to as (𝛽, 𝛿) model. Comparing with 
the traditional DU model, the utilities in a time horizon (0,1,2, …𝑇) are discounted by 
{1,𝛽𝛿,𝛽𝛿2, … ,𝛽𝛿𝑇} in the case of a (𝛽, 𝛿) model (Wilkinson and Klaes 2012, p111). 
 
Laibson (1997)  adopted this (𝛽, 𝛿) model to approximate the qualitative property of the 
general hyperbolic discounting function, as shown in equation (2.3.2). It is clear that (𝛽, 𝛿) model maintains most of the analytical tractability of the traditional exponential 
model. Specifically, at period one, the discount factor is 𝛽𝛿 ; after period one, the 
discount factor between two periods is just 𝛿, the same as exponential discounting.  
 
This (𝛽, 𝛿) model was adopted by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) to elegantly simplify 
the present-biased preferences. The effectiveness of (𝛽, 𝛿)  model relies on the 
assumption of a higher instantaneous discount rate between current and the next period 
(indicating the time-inconsistency), but a constant instantaneous discount rate between 
any two future period 1
                                                          
1 For the (𝛽, 𝛿) model, the instantaneous discount rate between current and the next period is 1−βδ
βδ
, while 
the instantaneous discount rate between any two future periods is 1−δ
δ
. Clearly, we have 1−βδ
βδ
> 1−δ
δ
. 
. A common strategy used to describe time-inconsistent 
preferences is to model each individual at different time points as separate “selves”. 
Current “self” behaves optimally and maximizes his/her life-time utility, while all the 
future “selves” are assumed to behave optimally and able to maximize his/her 
corresponding utilities in the future. As mentioned by Pollak (1968), there were two 
extreme assumptions about one individual’s belief about his/her future selves: A person 
could hold a naïve belief, which implied that the person simply believed future “selves” 
would have the same preferences just as the current “self”. That is, the person did not 
realize the problem that, with the approaching of time, future “selves” could make 
different choices, which would not be preferred by the current “self”. A person could hold 
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a sophisticated belief, which implied that the person anticipated the preference reversal of 
his/ her future “selves”. 
 
Whether individuals are sophisticated or naïve is still controversial between economists. 
Akerlof (1991) assumed naïve beliefs in his analysis about procrastination and obedience. 
Nevertheless, most economists assumed sophisticated beliefs when they modelled time-
inconsistency preferences. The reason for sophisticated beliefs is that people have 
“rational expectations” about future behaviours. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) argued 
that both sophistication and naivety were possible when individuals make anticipations 
about their future preferences. It was mentioned that, the use of self-commitment, like 
alcohol club, and fat farms provided evidence for sophisticated behaviours. As explained 
by him, only sophisticated agents could anticipate preference reversals of their future 
“selves” and therefore made a commitment to control their future “selves”. However, it 
indeed was shown that people did underestimate the level of deviation from their current 
preferences. The example given by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) was that individuals 
may frequently lose the “willpower” to resist the immediate temptations, whilst 
optimistically anticipated that they would regain the “willpower” to resist temptations 
later. 
 
Another research by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) allowed the person to be partially 
naïve, that is, the problem of future preference reversal was perceived by the person, 
however, the magnitude of it was underestimated. In order to model the partially naïve 
behaviour, a parameter ?̂?  was introduced to measure an individual’s belief about 
immediate gratification. In case of sophistication, a person was aware of the future 
preference reversal, and anticipated ?̂? = β. In case of naivety, a person would not realize 
future preference reversal, and anticipated ?̂? = 1. In case of partial naivety, a person 
anticipated ?̂? ∈ (β, 1). Results obtained by them have shown that any level of naivety 
could lead to results that were different from the prediction under complete sophistication. 
 
In order to illustrate the effect of partial naive belief, various empirical evidences was 
discussed by DellaVigna (2009). Studies about choosing between a monthly contract and 
pay-per-visit contract for a gym, effect of deadlines on homework completion and the 
setting of deadlines, credit card usage with different interest rates, default effects in 
retirement saving were discussed. It was shown that, for a partial naive agent, the 
consumption of investment good was overestimated, and the consumption of leisure good 
was underestimated. Characteristics about investment good were that efforts were 
required now and rewards would be delivered later. On the contrary, characteristics about 
consumption good were that an immediate reward was generated and a future cost would 
be involved. 
 
 
2.4 Implication for this study 
 
 
As highlighted by Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974a, 1974b), Fisher and 
Hanemann (1987), Hanemann (1989), Mäler and Fisher (2005), the replacement of a 
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stochastic variable by its expected value could lead to inappropriate land use decision. 
Therefore, this thesis will focus on the case that the stochastic variable will not be 
replaced by its expected value. 
 
This thesis targets to analyse the land conversion decision made by present-biased DM, 
whose preference is well illustrated by a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function, under 
uncertainty and irreversibility. In order to illustrate the instantaneous effect of hyperbolic 
discounting, a revised model, basing on Mäler and Fisher (2005)’s two-period 
framework, is constructed. Besides, the decision rules under standard exponential 
discounting, a time-consistent preference, is also illustrated as a benchmark. The extra 
flexibility and value generated by option to postpone the land conversion decision is also 
evaluated. 
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3 Method 
 
 
Given the theoretical underpinnings provided in the previous chapter, this one presents 
the research methods applied in this thesis. It starts with two traditions about research in 
social science: quantitative research and qualitative research. Then, the choice of method 
for this study and the unit of analysis are presented. In the last section, delimitation is 
highlighted.  
 
 
3.1 Research in social science  
 
 
Traditionally, quantitative research and qualitative research have been regarded as two 
basic research paradigms in social sciences. The differences between these two research 
paradigms are based on distinct philosophical assumptions about the reality: the former 
assumes that the reality is what observed by people and the latter believes that the reality 
is what constructed by human mind (Colin Robson, 2011). 
 
The first approach, quantitative research, emphasizes the importance of following the 
research methods used in natural sciences, such as physics, mathematics and chemistry, 
and claims that this is the scientific way to do research. The advocators of quantitative 
research insist that quantification of the obtained information and numerical analysis are 
of essential importance. In fact, quantitative research has been closely related to 
positivistic view of research, which insists that observation and experience are the direct 
sources for objective facts, and researchers have no influence on the phenomenon 
observed. However, criticisms of this positivistic view, like characteristics and values of 
the researchers will affect their observations, has advocated a post-positivistic approach. 
This post-positivistic view claims that, research is the process of exploring the universal 
laws, evidence is always not enough for researches and conclusions should be refined and 
examined given new observations. Recently, some followers of quantitative research go 
on with the old positivistic route, while others take into account these criticisms and go 
for post-positivistic research (Colin Robson, 2011).  
 
The second one highlights that the object of social research is human beings, who have 
consciousness and behave according to their willingness. Human beings are totally 
distinct from the general research objects in natural science, which can not perceive and 
react to what is happening around. And therefore, a different research approach other 
than the quantitative route used in natural sciences should be taken into account.  
  
It is not appropriate to say one research paradigm is better than the other. Both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches can be used to obtain certain research purposes. 
In fact, the choice of research paradigm largely depends on the content and purpose of the 
study. Recently, there is an increasing recognition about a mixed-methods approach, 
which combines the elements from both qualitative and quantitative research. And a 
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multi-strategy design which takes the advantages from both qualitative and quantitative 
research is advocated by many practising researchers (Colin Robson, 2011). 
 
 
3.2 Choice of method  
 
 
3.2.1 A dynamic approach 
 
 
This thesis focuses on the intertemporal aspect of decision about land use change. The 
traditional cost benefit analysis, which is a ‘now or never’ evaluation criterion, does not 
fit the research target of this thesis. In order to model the intertemporal decision about 
land use change, a dynamic approach will be used in this study. 
 
Dynamic approach here has three crucial features. First, the decision about land use 
change form preservation to development is assumed irreversible. That is, once the land 
is developed, it is not possible to reallocate the land back for preservation. Second, it is 
flexible for the DM to make this irreversible decision now or later, i.e. the decision about 
land use change could be delayed. Third, more information about future payoffs will 
come and the uncertainty will be reduced.  
 
Assume the net benefit from preservation and development now is 𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑒 1and 𝐵𝑑𝑒𝑣 1 , 
respectively; the net benefit from preservation and development later is 𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑒 2 and 𝐵𝑑𝑒𝑣 2, 
respectively. The overall benefit from preservation is denoted by P and the overall benefit 
from development is denoted by D. The purpose of this section is to develop a decision 
making model to illustrate the decision rules with respect to the land use change. It is 
implicitly assumed that the DM will choose the decision that could generate the highest 
net present benefits.  
 
In the future, the DM could choose the best decision according to the complete 
information about net benefit from preservation and development 𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑒 2  and 𝐵𝑑𝑒𝑣 2 . 
Denote 𝐵2 as the benefit later, we have   
 
 𝐵2 = 𝐸�max�𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑒 2,𝐵𝑑𝑒𝑣 2��. (3.2.1) 
 
If the DM goes for preservation now, the overall benefit will be  
 
 𝑃 = 𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑒 1 + 𝐸�max�𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑒 2,𝐵𝑑𝑒𝑣 2�� ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟. (3.2.2) 
 
If the DM goes for development now, later he/she will be locked in the development. The 
overall benefit will be  
 
 𝐷 = 𝐵𝑑𝑒𝑣 1 + 𝐸[𝐵𝑑𝑒𝑣 2] ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟. (3.2.3) 
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When 𝑃 > 𝐷, the DM will choose to preserve the land now; when 𝑃 < 𝐷, the DM will 
decide to develop the land now; and when 𝑃 = 𝐷, the DM will be indifferent between 
preservation and development. 
 
 
3.2.2 The choice of discounting functions 
 
 
Exponential discounting, which is characterized by a constant discount rate, is the 
standard discounting function used to illustrate individual’s intertemporal preferences. 
The discount structure of exponential discounting is  
 
 {1, 𝛿, 𝛿2, … }. (3.2.4) 
 
Exponential discounting is analytically simple. It is often referred to as time-consistent 
discounting, since it implies that the preferences of individuals toward two outcomes will 
not change no matter when they will be asked. However, more evidences have shown that 
individual’s preferences will change according to the passage of time. And they usually 
discount the short-run payoffs at a higher discount rate whilst discount the long-run 
payoffs at a lower discount rate. This present-biased preference could be well illustrated 
by a generalized hyperbola, which was first adopted by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). 
 
 D(𝑡) = (1 + 𝛼𝑡)−𝛽𝛼 ,𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝛼,𝛽 > 0.  (3.2.5) 
 
Laibson (1997)  adopted a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function, which was first 
proposed by Phelps and Pollak (1968), to approximate the qualitative property of the 
general hyperbolic discounting function (3.2.5).  
 
 𝐷(𝑡) = �1,        𝑖𝑓 𝑡 = 0
𝛽𝛿𝑡,    𝑖𝑓 𝑡 > 0 , where 0 < 𝛽 < 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 < 𝛿 < 1, (3.2.6) 
 
The discount structure of quasi-hyperbolic discounting function is  
 
 {1,𝛽𝛿,𝛽𝛿2, … }.  (3.2.7) 
 
It is clear that this discount structure {1,𝛽𝛿,𝛽𝛿2, … } maintains most of the analytical 
tractability of the exponential model, for which the discount structure is {1, 𝛿, 𝛿2, … }. At 
period one, the discount factor for quasi-hyperbolic discounting is 𝛽𝛿; after period one, 
the discount factor between two periods is just 𝛿 , which is the same as exponential 
discounting.  
 
This thesis will use the quasi-hyperbolic discounting, as shown in (3.2.6) to analyse the 
influence of hyperbolic discounting for the optimal land use decision. 
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3.3 The unit of analysis  
 
 
This thesis focuses on the study of a general land allocation decision between two 
competitive purposes, preservation and development. The factors affecting the decision 
making process of converting the land from preservation to development are studied. 
 
In order to illustrate the decision rules and results under hyperbolic discounting, the 
analysis under exponential discounting is discussed for comparison. In addition, an 
approximation of hyperbolic discounting, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, was used in the 
model setting. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting not only keeps the qualitative property of the 
general hyperbolic discounting function, but also maintains most of the analytical 
tractability of the standard exponential discounting function. 
 
 
3.4 Delimitations  
 
 
This study is a theoretical research about land allocation decision between two possible 
destinations: preservation and development. There could be some challenges about the 
assumptions of irreversible development and intertemporal resolution of uncertainty. 
However, when the developed land can only be used for a certain purpose, and more 
information would be available with the passage of time, these assumptions seem rather 
reasonable. Therefore, in this sense, the analysis is meaningful in order to solve real-life 
issues. 
 
This study is based on the two-period framework of Mäler and Fisher (2005), which is 
adequate to illustrate the main conclusions for irreversibility and intertemporal resolution 
of uncertainty. The simplicity of mathematics and effectiveness to show the main results 
after introducing hyperbolic discounting are the reasons for choosing this framework. 
Other theoretical framework, which is mainly about continuous time and stochastic 
processes, are not considered.    
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4 Model setting and decisions 
 
 
Assume a risk neutral DM owns one unit of land and he/she is concerned with the best 
use of this land. The best decision is defined in such a way that the net present value 
(benefits minus costs) of this plot of land is maximized. For the sake of simplicity, two 
possible uses of this land are considered: preservation and development. In other words, 
the land can be preserved in an original undeveloped situation, or be converted for 
developing purposes. An example of this kind of problem could be the decision about the 
use of a farming land. On the one hand, this land can be preserved and used for the initial 
purpose of agricultural production; on the other hand, this land could be converted for 
residential construction as well.  
 
Clearly, the decision about land use change between preservation and development could 
be put into effect at any point of time. However, the essential results can be decently 
illustrated by a discrete two-period model. For this two-period analysing framework, only 
a first period and a second period, which could also be referred to as now and future, are 
needed.   
 
There are five core assumptions about this model: (1) this unit of land could either be 
preserved or developed as a whole in the sense that partial development of this unit of 
land is not considered in this thesis; (2) this unit of land is initially undeveloped and it is 
flexible for the DM to develop the land now or in the future. The development of land is 
assumed to be irreversible. In other words, once the land is developed, it is not possible to 
reallocate the land for other purposes; (3) a cost will be involved in the period which the 
development of land is undertaken; (4) benefits from preservation and development in the 
first period are assumed to be known; the cost related to development is certain as well; 
(5) Benefit of preservation and development in the second period is stochastic, but it is 
assumed that information about future benefit will be available and taken into account at 
the start of the second period. 
 
 
4.1 Model setting  
 
 
An irreversible decision about land development can be made in the first period or be 
postponed to the second period. Assume the net benefit from first period development is 
𝐵1(𝑑1), where 𝑑1 ∈ {0,1} is the decision about the level of development in the first 
period. Therefore, net benefit from the first period preservation is represented by 𝐵1(0) 
and net benefit from the first period development is represented by 𝐵1(1). By assumption, B1(0) and B1(1) are known with certainty. 
 
The net benefit from second period development is 𝐵2(𝑑1,𝑑2), where 𝑑1 + 𝑑2 ∈ {0,1} 
and 𝑑2 is the decision about the level of development in the second period. Because the 
development is irreversible, we have d2 = 0 in the case of d1 = 1; and d2 ∈ {0,1} in the 
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case of d1 = 0 . By assumption, this net benefit from second period development is 
stochastic. Therefore, there will be two notations for the net benefit from second period 
development, 𝐵2(1,0) and 𝐵2(0,1). The numbers in parentheses are the levels of first-
period and second period development, respectively. Because there will be cost in the 
period which the development is undertaken, the former must be higher than the latter. In 
other words, we must have B2(1,0 ) > 𝐵2(0,1).  
 
Suppose there are only two possible situations in the second period, state 1 and state 2. 
And the DM holds the belief that, state 1 will occur with probability 𝜋, and that the state 
2 will occur with probability 1 − 𝜋 . When state 1 happens, net benefit from second 
period development, 𝐵21(0,1) , is higher than the net benefit from preservation, i.e.  
𝐵2
1(0,1) ≥ 𝐵21(0,0); And when state 2 occurs, net benefit from development, 𝐵22(1,0), is 
lower than the net benefit form preservation, i.e. 𝐵22(1,0) < 𝐵22(0,0). 
 
In what follows, exponential discounting and hyperbolic discounting will be taken into 
account, respectively.  
 
 
4.1.1 Exponential discounting 
 
 
We first consider the standard exponential discounting in our model. Notice that second 
period development decision, 𝑑2 will be decided at the start of the second period when 
the information about whether no development or full development yields higher benefit 
is available. At the start of the first period, when 𝑑1 must be decided, we only have the 
expected value of the maximal payoff for the second period decision. 
 
Given the development decision 𝑑1 chosen in the first period, thus, we have the expected 
value of the maximal net benefits in period 2  
 
 𝐵�2(𝑑2) = 𝐸 � max
𝑑2,𝑑1+𝑑2≤1𝐵2(𝑑1,𝑑2;𝜋)�. (4.1.1) 
 
The first period decision should be consistent with the maximization of expected net 
payoffs over both periods. Let’s define  𝑉�(𝑑1) as the expected payoffs over both periods. 
We know that 𝑑1 = 0 or 𝑑1 = 1. Assume the exponential discounting factor is 𝛿 = 11+𝑟, 
where 𝑟 is the discount rate for the interval of one period. 
 
In case of 𝑑1 = 1, that is, it is chosen to develop the unit of land in the first period. 
Because of irreversibility, in the second period there is no choice but keeping the land 
being developed. We have, the expected payoffs over both periods,  
 
 𝑉�(1) = 𝐵1(1) + 𝐵�2(0) ∗ 𝛿 = 𝐵1(1) + 𝐸[𝐵2(1; 0;𝜋)] ∗ 𝛿. (4.1.2) 
 
In case of 𝑑1 = 0, that is, it is chosen to postpone the development of the unit of land to 
the second period. In fact, when it comes to the second period, the information about 
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whether preservation or development provides a higher benefit is available. However, at 
the start of first period, only the expectation of the maximum is available. We have, the 
expected payoffs over both periods, 
 
 𝑉�(0) = 𝐵1(0) + 𝐵�2(𝑑2) ∗ 𝛿 = 𝐵1(0) + 𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� ∗ 𝛿. (4.1.3) 
 
   
4.1.2 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
  
 
Based on recent researches about intertemporal choice, it has shown that when 
individuals evaluate costs and benefits at different points if time, instead of discounting 
the payoffs in the future exponentially, individuals tend to discount the future payoffs 
hyperbolically. That is, they discount the short-run outcomes at a higher discount rate and 
discount the long-run outcomes at a lower discount rate. This present-biased preference 
of individuals could be well illustrated by a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function 
 
 𝐷(𝑡) = � 1𝛽𝛿𝑡   , 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 = 0,, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 > 0. (4.1.4) 
 
where t is the delayed time of future payoffs, 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] is the hyperbolic factor, and 
𝛿 = 1
1+𝑟
, where 𝑟  is the discount rate for the interval of one period, is just standard 
exponential discounting factor. When  𝛽 = 0 , the DM is an extreme hyperbolic 
discounter, who only cares about current outcomes, regardless of any consideration about 
future. When 𝛽 = 1, the DM is a standard exponential discounter. 
 
Similar with the case of exponential discounting, the first period decision should be 
consistent with the maximization of expected net payoffs over both periods. Let’s 
define 𝑉�(𝑑1) as the expected payoffs over both periods. We know that 𝑑1 = 0 or 𝑑1 = 1. 
By adopting quasi-hyperbolic discounting rather than exponential discounting, we have: 
 
In case of 𝑑1 = 1, that is, it is chosen to develop the whole land in the first period. 
Because of irreversibility, in the second period we have no choice but keep the whole 
land being developed. We have, the expected payoff over both periods, 
 
 𝑉�(1) = 𝐵1(1) + 𝐵�2(0) ∗ 𝛽𝛿 = 𝐵1(1) + 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)] ∗ 𝛽𝛿. (4.1.5) 
 
In case of 𝑑1 = 0, that is, it is chosen to postpone the development of the whole land to 
the second period. In fact, when it comes to the second period, it is known that whether 
preservation or development provide the higher benefit. However, at the start of the first 
period, only the expectation of the maximum is available. We have, the expected payoff 
over both periods, 
 
 𝑉�(0) = 𝐵1(0) + 𝐵�2(𝑑2) ∗ 𝛽𝛿 = 𝐵1(0) + 𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� ∗ 𝛽𝛿. (4.1.6) 
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4.2 Decisions 
 
 
4.2.1 Decision rules under exponential discounting 
 
 
In order to get the decision rules for the first period, d�1, we need to compare  V�(0) 
and  𝑉�(1)  , that is, 
 
 
V�(0) − V�(1) = B1(0) − B1(1) + δ ∗ �E � max
d2∈{0,1} B2(0, d2;π)� − E[B2(1,0;π)]�, (4.2.1) 
 
and choose 
 
 ?̂?1 = � 0,0 𝑜𝑟 1,1,       𝑖𝑓 𝑉�(0) > 𝑉�(1),𝑖𝑓 𝑉�(0) = 𝑉�(1),𝑖𝑓 𝑉�(0) < 𝑉�(1).  (4.2.2) 
 
Therefore, land is developed in the first period, when 𝑉�(0) < 𝑉�(1); the decision of 
development will be postponed to the second period, when 𝑉�(0) > 𝑉�(1); the DM will be 
indifferent between these two choices, when 𝑉�(0) = 𝑉�(1). 
 
 
4.2.2 Decision rules under quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
 
 
In order to derive the decision rules for the first period, ?̃?1, we need to compare   𝑉�(0) 
and  𝑉�(1), that is, 
 
 
𝑉�(0) − 𝑉�(1) = 𝐵1(0) − 𝐵1(1) + 𝛽𝛿 ∗ �𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� − 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)]�, (4.2.3) 
 
and choose 
 ?̃?1 = � 0,0 𝑜𝑟 1,1,       𝑖𝑓 𝑉�(0) > 𝑉�(1),𝑖𝑓 𝑉�(0) = 𝑉�(1),𝑖𝑓 𝑉�(0) < 𝑉�(1).  (4.2.4) 
 
Therefore, land is developed in the first period, when 𝑉�(0) < 𝑉�(1); the decision of 
development will be postponed to the second period, when  𝑉�(0) > 𝑉�(1); and the DM 
will be indifferent between these two choices, when 𝑉�(0) = 𝑉�(1).  
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5 Analysis and discussion 
 
 
5.1 Analysis 
 
 
5.1.1 Analysis under exponential discounting 
 
 
According to the decision rules illustrated by equation (4.2.2) in the section of 4.2.1, the 
level of development in the first period, ?̂?1, depends on the expected payoffs over both 
periods 𝑉�(?̂?1) . ?̂?1  can either be 0 or 1. Therefore, the decision about first period 
development will be determined by the value of 𝑉�(0) and 𝑉�(1).  
 
Consequently, there will be three different situations: 𝑉�(0) > 𝑉�(1), 𝑉�(0) < 𝑉�(1) and 
𝑉�(0) = 𝑉�(1). 
 
Case 1: V�(0) > 𝑉�(1) and ?̂?1 = 0. Under this situation, the land will not be converted in 
the first period. And it is optimal for the DM to wait and decide whether to convert the 
land or not in the second period. Therefore, we have 
 
 𝐵1(0) + 𝛿 ∗ �𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)�� > 𝐵1(1) + 𝛿 ∗ 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)]. (5.1.1) 
 
For the sake of simplicity, define 𝐴 = 𝐵1(1) − 𝐵1(0). “𝐴” is the difference between net 
benefits from development and preservation in the first period. Define 
𝐵 = 𝐸�max𝑑2∈{0,1} 𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� − 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)]. “𝐵” is the difference of net benefits in 
the second period by choosing preservation and development in the first period.  
 
Rearrange the inequality (5.1.1), and substitute in A and B, we have, 
 
 𝛿 ∗ 𝐵 > 𝐴. (5.1.2) 
 
First of all, with respect to 𝐴 = 𝐵1(1) − 𝐵1(0), it measures the difference between the 
net benefits from development and preservation in the first period. The sign of A may be 
positive, negative or zero. 
 
Secondly, we know that  
 
 
𝐵 = 𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� − 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)] =  𝐸[ max
𝑑2∈{0,1} {𝐵2(0,0;𝜋),𝐵2(0,1;𝜋)] − 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)]. (5.1.3) 
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The sign of B, which measures the difference between the net benefits of having the 
flexibility to make the optimal land use decision in the second period and having no other 
choice but locking in the situation of development in the second period, may be positive, 
negative or zero.  
 
(1) In case that 𝐴 = 0, as long as 𝐵 > 0, the inequality (5.1.2) will always hold. 𝐴 = 0 
implies that the DM will obtain the same payoffs in the first period no matter which 
strategy he/she choose in the first period. 𝐵 > 0  implies that the DM will get more 
payoffs in the second period if he/she chooses preservation in the first period.  Therefore, 
if 𝐴 = 0  and 𝐵 > 0 , preservation will always be the best choice for the first period 
decision. 
 
(2) In case that 𝐴 > 0, in order to make the inequality (5.1.2) hold, it must be true that 
𝐵 > 0. Substitute in 𝛿 = 1
1+𝑟
, and rearrange the inequality (5.1.2), we have,  
 
 𝐵
𝐴
− 1 > 𝑟. (5.1.4) 
 
𝐴 > 0 implies that the DM will obtain more payoffs in the first period if he/she decides to 
convert the land in the first period. 𝐵 > 0 implies that the DM will get more payoffs in 
the second period if he/she chooses preservation in the first period. Therefore, the DM 
needs to make a decision between getting more payoffs now and waiting to obtain more 
payoffs in the future. As illustrated by the inequality (5.1.4), in order to choose 
preservation rather than immediate conversion in the first period, the discount rate should 
be lower than 𝐵
𝐴
− 1. The DM will acquire fewer payoffs in the first period by choosing 
preserving the land, and at the same time, he/she will get more in the second period by 
making this decision. We know that the future payoffs will have a higher present value 
when discounted by a low discount rate. And therefore, if 𝐴 > 0, 𝐵 > 0 and 𝑟 < 𝐵
𝐴
− 1, 
the strategy of preservation will be favoured. 
 
(3) In case that 𝐴 < 0, as long as 𝐵 ≥ 0, the inequality (5.1.2) will always hold. 𝐴 < 0 
implies that the DM will obtain more payoffs in the first period if he/she preserves the 
land in the first period. 𝐵 ≥ 0 implies that the DM will not get fewer payoffs in the 
second period by choosing preservation in the first period. Therefore, if 𝐴 < 0 and 𝐵 ≥ 0, 
preserving the land will always be the best choice for the first period.  
 
(4) In case that 𝐴 < 0, and 𝐵 < 0, substitute in 𝛿 = 1
1+𝑟
, and rearrange the inequality 
(5.1.2), we have, 
 
 𝐵
𝐴
− 1 < 𝑟. (5.1.5) 
 
𝐴 < 0 implies that the DM will obtain more payoffs in the first period if he/she decides to 
preserve the land in the first period. 𝐵 < 0 implies that the DM will get more payoffs in 
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the second period if he/she chooses development in the first period. Still, the DM needs 
to make a decision between getting more payoffs now and waiting to obtain more payoffs 
in the future. As illustrated by the inequality (5.1.5), in order to go for postponement 
rather than immediate conversion, the discount rate should be higher than 𝐵
𝐴
− 1 . 
Comparing with the result obtained from inequality (5.1.4), this time the result is 
reversed. However, it is actually not surprising at all. The DM will acquire more payoffs 
in the first period by keeping the land under preservation, and at the same time, he/she 
will get fewer in the second period by undertaking this strategy. When the future payoffs 
will be discounted by a high discount rate, the future payoffs will have a lower present 
value. And therefore, if 𝐴 < 0, 𝐵 < 0 and 𝑟 > 𝐵
𝐴
− 1, the strategy of preservation in the 
first period will be favoured.  
 
Case 2: 𝑉�(0) < 𝑉�(1) and ?̂?1 = 1. Under this situation, the land will be immediately 
converted in the first period, even though the DM knows that she/he will have no other 
choice but keep the land being developed in the second period. We have 
 
 𝐵1(0) + 𝛿 ∗ �𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)�� < 𝐵1(1) + 𝛿 ∗ 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)]. (5.1.6) 
 
As mentioned in case 1, 𝐵 = 𝐵1(1) − 𝐵1(0) measures the difference between the net 
benefits from development and preservation in the first period. 
𝐴 = 𝐸�max𝑑2∈{0,1} 𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� − 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)]  measures the difference of the net 
benefits in the second period by choosing preservation and development in the first 
period.  
 
Rearrange the inequality (5.1.6), and substitute in A and B, we have  
 
 𝛿𝐵 < 𝐴. (5.1.7) 
 
The sign of A may be positive, negative or zero. And the sign of B may be positive, 
negative or zero as well. 
 
(1) In case that 𝐴 = 0, as long as 𝐵 < 0, the inequality (5.1.7) will always hold. 𝐴 = 0 
implies that the DM will obtain the same amount of payoffs in the first period no matter 
which decision he/she chooses in the first period. 𝐵 < 0 implies that the DM will get 
more payoffs in the second period if he/she chooses to develop the land in the first period. 
Therefore, if 𝐴 = 0 and 𝐵 < 0, immediate conversion will always be the best choice for 
the first period.  
 
(2) In case that A < 0, in order to make the inequality (5.1.7) hold, it must be true that 
𝐵 < 0. Substitute in 𝛿 = 1
1+𝑟
, and rearrange the inequality (5.1.7), we have, 
 
 𝐵
𝐴
− 1 > 𝑟. (5.1.8) 
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𝐴 < 0 implies that the DM will get more payoffs in the first period if he/she chooses 
preservation in the first period. 𝐵 < 0 implies that the DM will get more payoffs in the 
second period if he/she chooses development in the first period. The DM needs to make a 
decision between getting more payoffs now and waiting to obtain more payoffs in the 
future. As illustrated by the inequality (5.1.8), in order to go for immediate conversion 
rather than postponement, the discount rate should be lower than 𝐵
𝐴
− 1. The DM will get 
fewer payoffs in the first period by converting the land for development, and meanwhile, 
he/she will get more in the second period by undertaking this strategy. When the future 
payoffs will be discounted by a low discount rate, the future payoffs will have a high 
present value. And therefore, if 𝐴 < 0, 𝐵 < 0 and 𝑟 > 𝐵
𝐴
− 1, the strategy of development 
in the first period will be favoured.  
 
(3) In case that A > 0, as long as 𝐵 ≤ 0, the inequality (5.1.7) will always hold. 𝐴 > 0 
implies that the DM will obtain more payoffs in the first period if he/she converts the 
land in the first period. 𝐵 ≤ 0 implies that the DM will not get less payoffs in the second 
period by choosing development in the first period. Therefore, if 𝐴 > 0  and 𝐵 ≤ 0 , 
development will always be the best choice for the first period. 
 
(4) In case that A > 0 and 𝐵 > 0, substitute in 𝛿 = 1
1+𝑟
, and rearrange the inequality 
(5.1.7), we have,  
 
 𝐵
𝐴
− 1 < 𝑟. (5.1.9) 
 
𝐴 > 0 implies that the DM will get more payoffs in the first period if he/she chooses 
development in the first period. 𝐵 > 0 implies that the DM will get more payoffs in the 
second period if he/she chooses preservation in the first period. Therefore, still, the DM 
needs to make a decision between getting more payoffs now and waiting to obtain more 
payoffs in the future. As illustrated by the inequality (5.1.9), in order to go for immediate 
conversion rather than preservation, the discount rate should be higher than 𝐵
𝐴
− 1 . 
Comparing with the result obtained in inequality (5.1.8), this time the result is reversed. 
However, it is actually not surprising at all. The DM will acquire more payoffs in the first 
period by choosing developing the land, and at the same time, he/she will get fewer in the 
second period by taking this strategy. We know that the future payoffs will have a lower 
present value when discounted by a higher discounted by a high discount rate. And 
therefore, if 𝐴 > 0, 𝐵 > 0 and 𝑟 > 𝐵
𝐴
− 1, the decision of immediate conversion will be 
favoured. 
 
Case 3: 𝑉�(0) = 𝑉�(1) and ?̂?1 = 0 𝑜𝑟 1. Under this situation, the DM will be indifferent 
between immediate conversion of land and preserving the land in the first period. We 
have  
 
 𝐵1(0) + 𝛿 ∗ �𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(𝑑1,𝑑2;𝜋)�� = 𝐵1(1) + 𝛿 ∗ 𝐸[𝐵2(1;𝜋)]. (5.1.10) 
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Similarly, 𝐴 = 𝐵1(1) − 𝐵1(0)  and 𝐵 = 𝐸�max𝑑2∈{0,1} 𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� − 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)] . 
The interpretations of 𝐴 and 𝐵 are the same as before and both of them may be positive, 
negative or zero. 
 
Substitute in 𝐴 and 𝐵 to (5.1.10), we have  
 
 𝛿𝐵 = 𝐴. (5.1.11) 
 
In order to make the equation (5.1.11) hold, it must be true that the sign of 𝐴 should be 
the same with the sign of 𝐵. In other words, when 𝐴 = 0, it must be true that 𝐵 = 0; 
when 𝐴 > 0, it must be the true that 𝐵 > 0; when 𝐴 < 0, it must be the true that 𝐵 < 0. 
 
In case that 𝐴 = 0 and 𝐵 = 0, the equation (5.1.11) will always hold. In other cases, 
substitute in 𝛿 = 1
1+𝑟
, and rearrange the equation (5.1.11), we have  
 
 𝐵
𝐴
− 1 = 𝑟. (5.1.12) 
 
𝐵
𝐴
− 1 is the critical discount rate under standard exponential discounting that makes the 
DM indifferent between conversion in the first period and postponing the developing 
decision to the second period.  
 
In case that 𝐴 > 0 and 𝐵 > 0. When the discount rate is higher than 𝐵
𝐴
− 1, immediate 
conversion will be favoured in the first period. When the discount rate is lower than 
𝐵
𝐴
− 1, preserving the land will be favoured in the first period.  
 
In case that 𝐴 < 0 and 𝐵 < 0. When the discount rate is higher than 𝐵
𝐴
− 1, preserving the 
land in the first period will be favoured. When the discount rate is lower than 𝐵
𝐴
− 1, 
immediate conversion will be favoured in the first period. 
 
 
5.1.2 Analysis under quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
 
 
According to decision rules mentioned by equation (4.2.4) in the section of 4.2.2, the 
level of development in the first period, ?̃?1, depends on the expected payoffs over both 
periods 𝑉�(?̃?1) . ?̃?1  can either be 0 or 1. Therefore, the decision about first period 
development will be determined by the value of 𝑉�(0) and  𝑉�(1).  
 
Accordingly, there will be three different situations as well. 
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Case 1:  𝑉�(0) > 𝑉�(1) and ?̃?1 = 0. Under this situation, the land will not be converted in 
the first period, and it is optimal for the DM to wait and decide whether convert the land 
or not in the second period.  We have,  
 
 𝐵1(0) + 𝛽𝛿 ∗ �𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(𝑑1,𝑑2;𝜋)�� > 𝐵1(1) + 𝛽𝛿 ∗ 𝐸[𝐵2(1;𝜋)]. (5.1.13) 
 
Similar with the analysis under exponential discounting, for the sake of simplification, let 
us define A = 𝐵1(1) − 𝐵1(0) . “𝐴 ” is the difference between the net benefits from 
development and preservation in the first period. Define 
𝐵 = 𝐸�max𝑑2∈{0,1} 𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� − 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)]. “𝐵” is the difference of net benefits in 
the second period by choosing preservation and development in the first period.  
 
Rearrange the inequality (5.1.13), and substitute in 𝐴 and 𝐵, we have, 
 
 𝛽𝛿 ∗ 𝐵 > 𝐴. (5.1.14) 
 
The sign of 𝐴, may be positive, negative or zero. And the sign of 𝐵 may be positive, 
negative or zero as well.  
 
(1) In case that 𝐴 = 0 and 𝐵 > 0, the inequality (5.1.14) will always hold. 𝐴 = 0 implies 
that the DM will acquire the same amount of payoffs in the first period by preserving or 
developing the land in the first period. 𝐵 > 0 implies that the DM will get more payoffs 
in the second period by choosing preserving the land in the first period. And therefore, if 
𝐴 = 0 and 𝐵 > 0, preserving the land in the first period is always the best decision. 
 
(2) In case that 𝐴 > 0, in order to make the inequality (5.1.14) hold, it must be true that 
𝐵 > 0. Substitute in 𝛿 = 1
1+𝑟
, and rearrange the inequality (5.1.14), we have,  
 
 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 > 𝑟. (5.1.15) 
 
𝐴 > 0 implies that the DM will get more payoffs in the first period if he/she chooses 
development in the first period. 𝐵 > 0 implies that the DM will get more payoffs in the 
second period if he/she chooses preservation in the first period. Therefore, the DM needs 
to make a decision between getting more payoffs now and waiting to obtain more payoffs 
in the future. As illustrated by the inequality (5.1.15), in order to go for postponement 
rather than immediate conversion, the discount rate should be lower than 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1. The 
DM will obtain fewer payoffs in the first period by preserving the land, and in the 
meantime, he/she will get more in the second period by making this decision. We know 
that the future payoffs will have a higher present value when discounted by a low 
discount rate. And therefore, if 𝐴 > 0 , 𝐵 > 0  and 𝑟 < 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 , the strategy of 
preservation in the first period will be favoured. 
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(3) In case that A < 0, as long as 𝐵 ≥ 0, the inequality (5.1.14) will always hold. 𝐴 < 0 
implies that the DM will get more payoffs in the first period if he/she chooses to preserve 
the land in the first period. 𝐵 ≥ 0 implies that the DM will obtain more payoffs in the 
second period if he/she preserve the land in the first period. And therefore, if 𝐴 < 0 and 
𝐵 ≥ 0, preserving the land is always the best decision for the first period. 
 
(4) In case that A < 0 and B < 0, substitute in 𝛿 = 1
1+𝑟
, and rearrange the inequality 
(5.1.14), we have, 
 
 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 < 𝑟. (5.1.16) 
 
𝐴 < 0 implies that the DM will get more payoffs in the first period if he/she chooses 
preservation in the first period. 𝐵 < 0 implies that the DM will get more payoffs in the 
second period if he/she chooses development in the first period. Still, the DM needs to 
make a decision between getting more payoffs now and waiting to obtain more payoffs in 
the future. As illustrated by the inequality (5.1.16), in order to go for postponement rather 
than immediate conversion, the discount rate should be higher than 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1. Comparing 
with the result given by inequality (5.1.15), this time the result is reversed. However, it is 
actually not surprising at all. The DM will get more payoffs in the first period by keeping 
the land under preservation, and simultaneously, he/she will get fewer in the second 
period by undertaking this strategy. When the future payoffs will be discounted by a high 
discount rate, the future payoffs will have a lower present value. And therefore, if 𝐴 < 0, 
𝐵 < 0 and 𝑟 > 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1, the strategy of preservation in the first period will be favoured.  
 
Case 2:  𝑉�(0) < 𝑉�(1) and ?̃?1 = 1. Under this situation, it is best for the DM to convert 
the land for development in the first period.  We have,  
 
 𝐵1(0) + 𝛽𝛿 ∗ �𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(𝑑1,𝑑2;𝜋)�� < 𝐵1(1) + 𝛽𝛿 ∗ 𝐸[𝐵2(1;𝜋)]. (5.1.17) 
 
Similarly, 𝐴 = 𝐵1(1) − 𝐵1(0) and 𝐵 = 𝐸�max𝑑2∈{0,1} 𝐵2(𝑑1,𝑑2;𝜋)� − 𝐸[𝐵2(1;𝜋)]. The 
meanings of 𝐴 and 𝐵 are as before. Rearrange the inequality (5.1.17), and substitute in 
𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵, we have,  
 
 𝛽𝛿 ∗ 𝐵 < 𝐴. (5.1.18) 
 
The sign of 𝐴 may be positive, negative or zero. And the sign of 𝐵 may be positive, 
negative or zero. 
 
(1) In case that 𝐴 = 0, as long as 𝐵 < 0, the inequality (5.1.18) will always hold. 𝐴 = 0 
implies that the DM will obtain the same amount of payoffs in the first period by 
choosing either preservation or development in the first period. 𝐵 < 0 implies that the 
DM will get more payoffs in the second period by choosing development in the first 
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period. Therefore, if 𝐴 = 0 and 𝐵 < 0, converting the land is the best choice for the first 
period.  
 
(2) In case that 𝐴 < 0, in order to make the inequality (5.1.18) hold, it must be true that 
𝐵 < 0. Substitute in δ = 1
1+𝑟
 , and rearrange the inequality (5.1.18), we have 
 
 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 > 𝑟. (5.1.19) 
 
𝐴 < 0 implies that the DM will acquire more payoffs in the first period by preserving the 
land in the first period. 𝐵 < 0 implies that the DM will obtain more payoffs in the second 
period by choosing converting the land for development in the first period. The DM 
needs to make a choice between taking more payoffs now and being patient to obtain 
more payoffs in the future. As illustrated by the inequality (5.1.19), in order to go for 
immediate conversion rather than preservation, the discount rate should be lower than 
𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1. The DM will get fewer payoffs in the first period by developing the land, and in 
the meantime, he/she will get more in the second period by taking this strategy. We know 
that future payoffs will have a higher present value when discounted by a low discount 
rate. And therefore, if 𝐴 < 0 , 𝐵 < 0  and 𝑟 < 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 , the decision of immediate 
conversion will be favoured.  
 
(3) In case that 𝐴 > 0, as long as 𝐵 ≤ 0, the inequality (5.1.18) will always hold. 𝐵 ≤ 0 
implies that the DM will not get fewer payoffs in the second period by choosing 
development in the first period. 𝐴 > 0 implies that the DM will obtain more payoffs in 
the first period by choosing development in the first period. Therefore, if 𝐴 > 0 and 
𝐵 ≤ 0, development is the best decision for the first period. 
 
(4) In case that 𝐴 > 0 and 𝐵 > 0, substitute in δ = 1
1+𝑟
 , and rearrange the inequality 
(5.1.18), we have 
 
 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 < 𝑟. (5.1.20) 
 
𝐴 > 0 implies that the DM will get more payoffs in the first period if he/she chooses 
development in the first period. 𝐵 > 0 implies that the DM will acquire more payoffs in 
the second period if he/she chooses preservation in the first period. Still, the DM needs to 
make a decision between getting more payoffs now and waiting to obtain more payoffs in 
the future. As illustrated by the inequality (5.1.20), in order to go for immediate 
conversion rather than preservation, the discount rate should be higher than 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1. The 
DM will obtain more payoffs in the first period by converting the land for development, 
and in the meantime, he/she will get less in the second period by making this decision. 
We know that the future payoffs will have a lower present value when discounted by a 
 30 
 
high discount rate. And therefore, if 𝐴 > 0 , 𝐵 > 0  and 𝑟 > 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 , the decision of 
immediate conversion will be favoured. 
 
Case 3:  𝑉�(0) = 𝑉�(1) and ?̃?1 = 0 𝑜𝑟1. Under this situation, the DM will be indifferent 
between immediate conversion and immediate preservation of the land.  We have,  
 
 𝐵1(0) + 𝛽𝛿 ∗ �𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(𝑑1,𝑑2;𝜋)�� = 𝐵1(1) + 𝛽𝛿 ∗ 𝐸[𝐵2(1;𝜋)]. (5.1.21) 
 
Similarly, 𝐴 = 𝐵1(1) − 𝐵1(0) and 𝐵 = 𝐸�max𝑑2∈{0,1} 𝐵2(𝑑1,𝑑2;𝜋)� − 𝐸[𝐵2(1;𝜋)]. The 
interpretation of 𝐴  and 𝐵  is the same as before, and both of them may be positive, 
negative or zero.  
 
Rearrange the inequality (5.1.21), and substitute in 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵, we have,  
 
 
 𝛽𝛿 ∗ 𝐵 = 𝐴. (5.1.22) 
 
In order to make this equation hold, it must be true that the sign of 𝐴 and the sign of 𝐵 
should be the same. In other words, when 𝐴 = 0, it must be true that 𝐵 = 0. When 𝐴 >0, it must be true that 𝐵 > 0. when 𝐴 < 0, it must be true that 𝐵 < 0. 
 
In case that 𝐴 = 0 and 𝐵 = 0, the equation (5.1.22) will always hold. In other cases, 
substitute in = 1
1+𝑟
 , and rearrange equation (5.1.22), we have 
 
 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 = 𝑟. (5.1.23) 
 
𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1  is the critical discount rate under hyperbolic discounting that makes the DM 
indifferent between conversion in the first period and postponing the developing decision 
to the second period.  
 
In case that 𝐴 > 0 and 𝐵 > 0. When the discount rate is higher than 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1, immediate 
conversion will be favoured, and when the discount rate is lower than 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 , 
postponement will be favoured. 
 
In case that 𝐴 < 0  and  𝐵 < 0 . When the discount rate is higher than 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 , 
postponement will be favoured, and when the discount rate is lower than 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 , 
immediate conversion will be favoured. 
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5.2 Discussion 
 
 
5.2.1 A change in the value of “A” and “B” 
 
 
As illustrated in section 5.1, A = 𝐵1(1) − 𝐵1(0) , 𝐵 = 𝐸�max𝑑2∈{0,1} 𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� −
𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)]. “𝐴” measures the difference between net benefits from development and 
preservation in the first period. “𝐵” measures the difference of net benefits in the second 
period by choosing preservation and development in the first period.  
 
Therefore, under exponential discounting,  
 
 
𝑉�(0) − 𝑉�(1) = B1(0) − B1(1) + δ ∗ �E � max
d2∈{0,1} B2(0, d2;π)� − E[B2(1,0;π)]� = 𝛿𝐵 − 𝐴. (5.2.1) 
 
Under hyperbolic discounting,  
 
 
𝑉�(0) − 𝑉�(1) = B1(0) − B1(1) + βδ ∗ �E � max
d2∈{0,1} B2(0, d2;π)� − E[B2(1,0;π)]� = 𝛽𝛿𝐵 − 𝐴. (5.2.2) 
 
(1) Ceteris paribus, when “ 𝐴 ” increases, both 𝑉�(0) − 𝑉�(1)  and 𝑉�(0) − 𝑉�(1)  will 
decrease. Hence, an increase in “𝐴” will favour the decision of immediate converting the 
land for development purpose in the first period. In contrast, when “𝐴” decreases, both 
𝑉�(0) − 𝑉�(1) and 𝑉�(0) − 𝑉�(1) will increase. Therefore, a decrease in “𝐴” will favour the 
decision of preserving the land in the first period. The economic insight behind this is not 
that complex. Keeping all the other factors unchanged, an increase in “𝐴” implies an 
increase of the net benefit from development or a decrease of the net benefit from 
preservation. Accordingly, the DM will be motivated to grab the extra payoffs by 
developing the land. Similarly, with all the other factors being constant, a decrease in “𝐴” 
implies a decline of net benefit from development or a rise of net benefit from 
preservation. As a result, preserving the land will be preferred in the first period.  
 
(2) Ceteris paribus, when “ 𝐵 ” increases, both 𝑉�(0) − 𝑉�(1)  and 𝑉�(0) − 𝑉�(1)  will 
increase. Thus, an increase in “𝐵” will favour the decision of preserving the land in the 
first period. In contrast, when “𝐵” decreases, both 𝑉�(0) − 𝑉�(1) and 𝑉�(0) − 𝑉�(1) will 
decrease. Therefore, a decrease in “𝐵” will favour the decision of immediate converting 
the land for development purpose in the first period. The economic insight behind this is 
not that complex either. Holding other factors constant, an increase in “𝐵” implies an 
increase of the net benefit from preservation of second period by choosing preserving the 
land in the first period or a decline of the net benefit from development of second period 
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by choosing developing the land in the first period. Consequently, the DM will be 
motivated to wait and choose the preservation in the first period. Similarly, with other 
factors being unchanged, a decline in “𝐵” implies a decrease of the net benefit from 
preservation of second period by choosing preserving the land in the first period or a rise 
of the net benefit from development of second period by choosing developing the land in 
the first period. As a result, the DM will tend to convert the land in the first period. 
 
 
5.2.2 A change in the discount rate 
 
 
According to the analysis in section 5.1, we know that, 
 
(1) If 𝐴 = 0  and at the same time 𝐵 > 0  or 𝐴 < 0  and at the same time 𝐵 ≥ 0 , 
preserving the land in the first period in order to have the option to make flexible 
decisions in the second period will always be the best choice for the DM. In this 
case, the change of discount rate does not have any impact on the development 
decision in the first period. 
 
(2) If 𝐴 = 0  and meanwhile 𝐵 < 0  or 𝐴 > 0  and meanwhile 𝐵 ≤ 0 , immediate 
converting the land for development purpose in the first period will always be the 
best decision for the DM. Similarly, in this situation, the change of discount rate 
does not influence the development decision in the first period. 
 
(3) In case that 𝐴 > 0  and 𝐵 > 0 , with the increase of discount rate, the overall 
payoff 𝑉�(0)  and 𝑉�(0)  will be reduced more than the overall payoff 𝑉�(1) 
and 𝑉�(1). Therefore, an increase of discount rate will favour the decision of 
immediate converting the land. Similarly, with the decrease of discount rate, the 
overall payoff 𝑉�(0) and 𝑉�(0) will be increased more than the overall payoff 𝑉�(1) 
and 𝑉�(1) . Thus, a decrease of the discount rate will favour the decision of 
preserving the land in the first period.  
 
Proof. See appendix 1. 
 
(4) In case that 𝐴 < 0  and 𝐵 < 0 , with the increase of discount rate, the overall 
payoff  𝑉�(1) and 𝑉�(1) will be reduced more than the overall payoff 𝑉�(0) and 
𝑉�(0) . Therefore, an increase of discount rate will favour the decision of 
preserving the land in the first period. Similarly, with the decrease of discount 
rate, the overall payoff 𝑉�(1) and 𝑉�(1) will be increased more than the overall 
payoff 𝑉�(0) and 𝑉�(0). Therefore, a decrease of the discount rate will favour the 
decision of immediate conversion of the land. 
 
Proof. See appendix 2. 
 
The changes in discount rate and the corresponding influences for the first period land 
allocation decisions are summarized in table 1. 
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Table 1.  Changes in discount rate and the corresponding first period land allocation 
decisions 
First period land 
allocation decision Exponential discounting Quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
Preserving the land 
𝐴 = 0,𝐵 > 0  
𝐴 < 0,𝐵 ≥ 0  
𝐴 > 0,𝐵 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟 < 𝐵
𝐴
− 1 
𝐴 < 0,𝐵 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟 > 𝐵
𝐴
− 1 
𝐴 = 0,𝐵 > 0  
𝐴 < 0,𝐵 ≥ 0  
𝐴 > 0,𝐵 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟 < 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 
𝐴 < 0,𝐵 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟 > 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 
Developing the land 
𝐴 = 0,𝐵 < 0  
𝐴 > 0,𝐵 ≤ 0  
𝐴 > 0,𝐵 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟 > 𝐵
𝐴
− 1 
𝐴 < 0,𝐵 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟 < 𝐵
𝐴
− 1 
𝐴 = 0,𝐵 < 0  
𝐴 > 0,𝐵 ≤ 0  
𝐴 > 0,𝐵 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟 > 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 
𝐴 < 0,𝐵 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟 < 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 
Being indifferent 
between preservation 
and development 
𝐴 = 0,𝐵 = 0  
𝐴 > 0,𝐵 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟 = 𝐵
𝐴
− 1 
𝐴 < 0,𝐵 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟 = 𝐵
𝐴
− 1 
𝐴 = 0,𝐵 = 0  
𝐴 > 0,𝐵 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟 = 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 
𝐴 < 0,𝐵 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟 = 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1 
 
Besides, the critical discount rate, 𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝∗ , under exponential discounting, which makes the 
DM indifferent between immediate development and postponement of the development, 
is 𝐵
𝐴
− 1. And the critical discount rate, 𝑟ℎ𝑦𝑝∗ , under quasi-hyperbolic discounting, which 
makes the DM indifferent between immediate development and postponement of the 
development is 𝛽𝐵
𝐴
− 1. Apparently, we have  𝑟ℎ𝑦𝑝∗ < 𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝∗ . That is, the required critical 
discount rate for hyperbolic discounting is lower than exponential discounting. 
 
(1) In case that 𝐴 > 0  and 𝐵 > 0 . When the discount rate 𝑟 < 𝑟ℎ𝑦𝑝∗ , under both 
discounting functions, the DM will choose to preserve the land. When the 
discount rate 𝑟 > 𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝∗ , under both discounting functions, the DM will choose to 
convert the land. The interesting thing is, when the discount rate 𝑟 ∈ (𝑟ℎ𝑦𝑝∗ , 𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝∗ ), 
under the standard exponential discounting, the DM will decide to preserve the 
land in the first period; while on the contrary, under hyperbolic discounting, the 
DM will decide to convert the land in the first period. Therefore, ceteris paribus, 
when there is an immediate reward by converting the land for developing 
purpose, under hyperbolic discounting, the DM tends to be more impatient and 
convert the land in the first period.  
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(2) In case that 𝐴 < 0  and 𝐵 < 0 . When the discount rate 𝑟 < 𝑟ℎ𝑦𝑝∗ , under both 
discounting functions, the DM will choose to immediate converting the land for 
development purposes. When the discount rate 𝑟 > 𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝∗ , under both discounting 
functions, the DM will choose to preserve the land in the first period. There will 
be a certain range, that is, when the discount rate 𝑟 ∈ (𝑟ℎ𝑦𝑝∗ , 𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝∗ ), under the 
standard exponential discounting, the DM will decide to immediate convert the 
land; in contrast, under hyperbolic discounting, the DM will choose to preserve 
the land in the first period. Therefore, ceteris paribus, when there is an immediate 
cost by converting the land for developing purpose, under hyperbolic discounting, 
the DM tends to wait and decide later. 
 
The comparison between the critical discounting rates under exponential discounting and 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting are summarized in table 2. 
 
Table 2.  First period land allocation decision under different discounting schemes 
 Discounting schemes 𝑟 < 𝑟ℎ𝑦𝑝∗  𝑟 ∈ (𝑟ℎ𝑦𝑝∗ , 𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝∗ ) 𝑟 > 𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝∗  
𝐴 > 0  
𝑎𝑛𝑑  
𝐵 > 0 
Exponential 
discounting Preservation Preservation  Development 
Quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting Preservation Development Development 
𝐴 < 0  
𝑎𝑛𝑑  
𝐵 < 0 
Exponential 
discounting Development Development  Preservation 
Quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting Development Preservation Preservation 
 
 
5.2.3 A change in the probability 
 
 
In order to illustrate the influence of probability for the land allocation decisions, we 
consider the following situation: suppose there are only two possible states in the second 
period, state 1 and state 2. And the DM holds the belief that, state 1 will occur with 
probability 𝜋, and state 2 will occur with probability 1 − 𝜋. When state 1 happens, net 
benefit from second period development, 𝐵21(0,1), is higher than the net benefit from 
second period preservation, i.e. 𝐵21(0,1) ≥ 𝐵21(0,0); when state 2 occurs, net benefit from 
development, 𝐵21(1,0), is lower than the net benefit form preservation, i.e. 𝐵22(1,0) <
𝐵2
2(0,0). 
 
Therefore, the overall payoffs under hyperbolic discounting: 
 
In case that ?̃?1 = 0, 
 
 𝑉�(0) = 𝐵1(0) + 𝛽𝛿 ∗ �𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)�� (5.2.3) 
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= B1(0) + 𝛽𝛿 ∗ �𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1} {𝐵2(0,1;𝜋),𝐵2(0,0;𝜋)}�� = 𝐵1(0) + 𝛽𝛿 ∗ [𝜋𝐵21(0,1) + (1 − 𝜋)𝐵22(0,0)]. 
 
In case that ?̃?1 = 1, 
 
 𝑉
�(1) = 𝐵1(1) + 𝛽𝛿 ∗ 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)] = B1(1) + 𝛽𝛿 ∗ [𝜋𝐵21(1,0) + (1 − 𝜋)𝐵22(1,0)] (5.2.4) 
 
Therefore, when the probability of state 1 occurs is quite high, i.e. 𝜋 → 1, we have in the 
second period, 𝐵21(0,1) ≥ 𝐵2(0,0). And therefore,  
  
 lim
𝜋→1
𝑉�(0) = 𝐵1(0) + 𝛽𝛿𝐵21(0,1) (5.2.5) 
 
 lim
𝜋→1
𝑉�(1) = 𝐵1(1) + 𝛽𝛿𝐵21(1,0) (5.2.6) 
 
From (5.2.5) and (5.2.6), we can see that, the difference between lim𝜋→1 𝑉�(0)  and lim𝜋→1 𝑉�(1) depends on the difference between 𝐵1(0) and 𝐵1(1), difference between 
𝐵2
1(0,1)  and 𝐵21(1,0), the quasi-hyperbolic parameter 𝛽 and the exponential discounting 
factor 𝛿.  
 
By assumption, we have 𝐵21(0,1) < 𝐵21(1,0). Then,  
 
 lim𝜋→1𝐵 = lim𝜋→1𝐸 � max𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� − lim𝜋→1𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)] = 𝐵21(0,1) − 𝐵21(1,0) < 0. (5.2.7) 
 
If 𝐴 = 𝐵1(1) − 𝐵1(0) ≥ 0, according to the analysis in section 5.2.2, the decision of 
development in the first period will always be favoured. In other words, immediate 
conversion is the best choice under both discounting schemes.  
 
If 𝐴 < 0, under hyperbolic discounting, future net benefits are discounted more than 
under exponential discounting. According to the analysis in section 5.2.2, preserving the 
land in the first period will be favoured under hyperbolic discounting. 
 
When the probability of state 2 occurs is quite high, i.e. 𝜋 → 0, we have in the second 
period, 𝐵22(1,0) < 𝐵22(0,0). And thus,  
 
 lim
𝜋→0
𝑉�(0) = 𝐵1(0) + 𝛽𝛿𝐵22(0,0) (5.2.8) 
 
 lim
𝜋→0
𝑉�(1) = 𝐵1(1) + 𝛽𝛿𝐵22(1,0) (5.2.9) 
 
From (5.2.8) and (5.2.9), we can see that, the difference between lim𝜋→0 𝑉�(0)  and lim𝜋→0 𝑉�(1)  depends on difference between 𝐵1(0)  and 𝐵1(1) , difference between 
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𝐵2
2(0,0)  and 𝐵22(1,0), the quasi-hyperbolic parameter 𝛽 and the exponential discounting 
factor 𝛿. 
 
By assumption, we have 𝐵22(0,0) > 𝐵22(1,0). Then, 
 
 
lim
𝜋→0
𝐵 = lim
𝜋→0
𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� − lim𝜋→1𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)] = 𝐵22(0,0) − 𝐵22(1,0) > 0. 
 
(5.2.10) 
 
If 𝐴 = 𝐵1(1) − 𝐵1(0) ≤ 0, according to the analysis in section 5.2.2, the decision of 
preservation in the first period will always be favoured. In other words, preserving the 
land in the first period is the best choice under both discounting schemes.  
 
If 𝐴 > 0, under hyperbolic discounting, future net benefits are discounted more than 
under exponential discounting. According to the analysis in section 5.2.2, converting the 
land for development purpose in the first period will be favoured under hyperbolic 
discounting. 
 
 
5.2.4 The impact on option value 
 
 
The analysis above focuses on the impact of different discounting schemes about the first 
period land allocation decision under the hypothesis of being able to take advantage of 
future information. In order to illustrate influences of exponential discounting and 
hyperbolic discounting on the quasi-option value, discount factor will be introduced to 
the two-period framework set out by Mäler and Fisher (2005). Two scenarios, one 
scenario with forthcoming complete information resolving the uncertainty and the other 
scenario without this expectation, will be presented. 
 
Scenario 1: with prospect of available information to resolve the uncertainty, the DM can 
use this information to make the best decision in the second period given any level of 
development in the first period. The overall payoffs to the DM is denoted by 𝐹�(𝑑1), and 
the discount factor, either hyperbolic discounting or exponential discounting, is denoted 
as DF. 
 
If 𝑑1 = 0, 
 
 𝐹�(0) = 𝐵1(0) + 𝐵�2(𝑑2) ∗ 𝐷𝐹 = 𝐵1(0) + 𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� ∗ 𝐷𝐹 (5.2.11) 
 
If 𝑑1 = 1, 
 
 𝐹�(1) = 𝐵1(1) + 𝐵�2(0) ∗ 𝐷𝐹 = 𝐵1(1) + 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)] ∗ 𝐷𝐹. (5.2.12) 
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Decision rules under scenario1:  
 
 max
𝑑1
𝐹�(𝑑1) = max{𝐹�(0),𝐹�(1)}. (5.2.13) 
 
Scenario 2: No expectation of information that would permit DM to resolve the 
uncertainty and the DM has to make a decision given any level of development in the 
first period. The overall payoff to the DM is denoted by 𝐹�(𝑑1). 
 
If 𝑑1 = 0, 
 
 𝐹�(0) = 𝐵1(0) + 𝐵�2(𝑑2) ∗ 𝐷𝐹 = 𝐵1(0) + max𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐸[𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)] ∗ 𝐷𝐹 (5.2.14) 
 
If 𝑑1 = 1, 
 
 𝐹�(1) = 𝐵1(1) + 𝐵�2(0) ∗ 𝐷𝐹 = 𝐵1(1) + 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)] ∗ 𝐷𝐹. (5.2.15) 
 
Decision rules under scenario 2:  
 
 max
𝑑1
𝐹�(𝑑1) = max{𝐹�(0),𝐹�(1)}. (5.2.16) 
 
We know that, by preserving the land in the first period, 
 
 
  𝐹�(0) − 𝐹�(0) = {𝐵1(0) + 𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� ∗ 𝐷𝐹} − 
    {𝐵1(0) + max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐸[𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)] ∗ 𝐷𝐹} = 𝐷𝐹 ∗ �𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� − max𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐸[𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)]�. 
(5.2.17) 
 
According to Jensen’s Inequality (Mäler and Fisher, 2005), we know that, the expected 
value of a convex function of a random variable is no less than the convex function of the 
expected value of the random variable. And the maximum function is a convex function2
 
. 
We have 
 𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� − max𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐸[𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)] ≥ 0. (5.2.18) 
 
As a result, it will always be true that,  
  
 
𝐹�(0) − 𝐹�(0) = 
𝐷𝐹 ∗ �𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� − max𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐸[𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)]� ≥ 0 (5.2.19) 
 
                                                          
2 For details, see Appendix 3. 
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𝐷𝐹 ∈ [0,1], is the discount factor. And what is interesting is that, no matter exponential 
discounting, where 𝐷𝐹 = 𝛿, or hyperbolic discounting, where 𝐷𝐹 = 𝛽𝛿, we always have 
a nonnegative quasi-option value. This nonnegative option value exists if and only if the 
best strategy in the first period is preserving the land.  
 
Clearly, the hyperbolic discounting factor 𝛽𝛿 is lower than the exponential discounting 
factor 𝛿. And thus, under hyperbolic discounting, the quasi-option value will be no higher 
than under exponential discounting.  
 
Under both scenarios, we will have 𝐹�(1) = 𝐹�(1). In case that 𝐹�(1) > 𝐹�(0) and 𝐹�(1) > 
𝐹�(0), converting the land for developing purpose in the first period will be the best 
choice under both scenarios. Here, we consider the interesting case, where   
 
    𝐹�(0) ≥ 𝐹�(1) = 𝐹�(1) ≥ 𝐹�(0). (5.2.20) 
 
This implication for the situation is that there will be cases that development is the 
optimal strategy in the first period with the prospect of no information; however, 
preservation is the optimal strategy in the first period with the prospect of information. In 
other words, current development is less likely with the prospect of forthcoming 
information to resolve all the uncertainty.   
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6 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
 
6.1 Synthesis of the results 
 
 
This thesis targets to model the best land allocation decision between two alternatives: 
preservation and development. The factors affecting decision rules under a more 
appropriate discounting scheme, hyperbolic discounting is taken into account in this 
study. In addition, decision rules obtained under exponential discounting are discussed 
for comparison.  
 
In this two-period model, it has been shown that, in case of immediate reward from 
converting the land for development purpose, the land will be converted earlier under 
hyperbolic discounting. On the contrary, in case of immediate cost from converting the 
land for development purpose, the decision about land conversion will be postponed 
under hyperbolic discounting. 
 
In addition, when an optimistic state associated with development occurs, or a high 
probability is attached to this optimistic state, the difference of net benefits in the second 
period by choosing preservation and development in the first period will be negative. 
Land will be converted later under hyperbolic discounting. In contrast, when a 
pessimistic state associated with development occurs, or a high probability is attached to 
this pessimistic state, the difference of net benefits in the second period by choosing 
preservation and development in the first period will be positive. The land will be 
converted earlier under hyperbolic discounting. 
 
This study has also shown that, a quasi-option value exists if and only if preserving is the 
best strategy for the first period. This quasi-option value will be reduced more under 
hyperbolic discounting than under exponential discounting.  
 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
 
 
This study has shown that, when an immediate reward is associated with the land 
development, the land will be converted earlier under hyperbolic discounting than under 
exponential discounting. As a result, this could lead to the over-development of land. In 
order to avoid the overdevelopment of land, policy targets to compensate the landowner 
for the forgone benefit from development should be considered.  
 
On the contrary, when an immediate cost is associated with the land development, the 
land will be converted later under hyperbolic discounting than under exponential 
discounting. As a result, this could potentially result in over-preservation of land. In order 
to keep a certain amount of land being developed, policy should compensate the 
landowner for the forgone benefit from preservation. 
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6.3 Suggestions for future research 
 
 
This study has shown the impact on option value and the optimal land allocation decision 
by introducing different discounting functions, i.e. exponential discounting and 
hyperbolic discounting. These results have been illustrated by a simple but effective two-
period framework.  
 
In this analysis, the main difference between hyperbolic discounting and exponential 
discounting is that future payoffs are discounted more under hyperbolic discounting and 
discounted less under exponential discounting. Or equivalently, the decision rules under 
hyperbolic discounting could be obtained under exponential discounting by using a high 
discount rate. Indeed, it holds within a two-period framework. However, it will definitely 
not be the case for a multi-period analysis, for which, at least three periods should be 
taken into account.  
 
The fundamental difference between exponential discounting and hyperbolic discounting 
is that exponential discounting is time consistent and hyperbolic discounting will lead to 
time inconsistent behaviour. Time consistency means that individual’s preferences 
toward future payoffs are the same no matter when he/she is asked. On the contrary, time 
inconsistency implies that individual’s preferences toward future payoffs will change 
according to how delayed the future payoffs are from the time for making the decision. A 
large amount of observations, psychological and experimental studies have shown that 
individuals’ preferences over benefits and costs at different points in time are actually 
time-inconsistent. And therefore, individual’s intertemporal choices are better illustrated 
by hyperbolic discounting rather than exponential discounting.  
 
A common strategy used to model time-inconsistent preference is: Individual at each time 
point is modelled as a separate “self”. The current “self” is able to behave optimally to 
maximize current self’s utility; while future “selves” are assumed to behave optimally in 
future periods to maximize future selves’ utility. As mentioned by Pollak (1968), there 
are two extreme assumptions about an individual’s belief about his/her future “selves”: A 
person could be naïve, that is, the person did not realize the problem of preference 
reversal. In other words, with the approaching of time, future “selves” could make 
another decision, for which the current “self” would not prefer today. A person could be 
sophisticated, that is, the person took into account the preference reversal of future selves. 
Further research by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) suggested that individual could also 
be partially naïve. Partial naivety implies the person realized he/she might have a 
problem of future preference reversal, but the magnitude was underestimated by the 
current “self”. 
 
In this study, the effect of time-inconsistency for hyperbolic discounting has not been 
illustrated. For future research about optimal land allocation decisions, an extension of 
this two period framework, a three-period model may be considered to describe the effect 
of time inconsistency under hyperbolic discounting.   
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Appendix 1 
 
 
We know that  
 
 
 𝑉
�(0) = 𝐵1(0) + 𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� ∗ 11 + 𝑟,  
 
 
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉�(1) = 𝐵1(1) + 𝐸[𝐵2(1; 0;𝜋)] ∗ 11 + 𝑟.  
 
Therefore,  
 
 
 
𝑑𝑉�(0)
𝑑𝑟
= − 1(1 + 𝑟)2 �𝐸 � max𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)��,  
 
 
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑉�(1)𝑑𝑟 = − 1(1 + 𝑟)2 {𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)}.  
 
Clearly, when 𝐵 > 0, that is, 𝐸�max𝑑2∈{0,1} 𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� > 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)], we have, 
𝑑𝑉�(0)
𝑑𝑟
< 𝑑𝑉�(1)
𝑑𝑟
< 0 
 
Therefore, when 𝑟 increase, 𝑉�(0) will decrease more than the decrease of 𝑉�(1); when 𝑟 
decreases, 𝑉�(0) will increase more than the increase of 𝑉�(1). 
 
Similarly,  
 
 
 
𝑑𝑉�(0)
𝑑𝑟
= − 1(1 + 𝑟)2 𝛽 �𝐸 � max𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)��,  
 
 
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑉�(1)𝑑𝑟 = − 1(1 + 𝑟)2 𝛽{𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)}.  
 
When B > 0 , that is, 𝐸�max𝑑2∈{0,1} 𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� > 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)] , we have 𝑑𝑉�(0)𝑑𝑟 <
𝑑𝑉�(1)
𝑑𝑟
< 0.  
Therefore, when 𝑟 increase, 𝑉�(0) will decrease more than the decrease of 𝑉�(1); when 
𝑟 decreases, 𝑉�(0) will increase more than the increase of  𝑉�(1) as well. 
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Appendix 2 
 
We know that  
 
 
 𝑉
�(0) = 𝐵1(0) + 𝐸 � max
𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� ∗ 11 + 𝑟,  
 
 
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉�(1) = 𝐵1(1) + 𝐸[𝐵2(1; 0;𝜋)] ∗ 11 + 𝑟.  
 
Therefore,  
 
 
 
𝑑𝑉�(0)
𝑑𝑟
= − 1(1 + 𝑟)2 �𝐸 � max𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)��,  
 
 
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑉�(1)𝑑𝑟 = − 1(1 + 𝑟)2 {𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)]}.  
 
Clearly, when B< 0, that is, 𝐸�max𝑑2∈{0,1} 𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� < 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋), we have, 
𝑑𝑉�(1)
𝑑𝑟
< 𝑑𝑉�(0)
𝑑𝑟
< 0. 
 
Therefore, when 𝑟 increases, 𝑉�(1) will decrease more than the decrease of 𝑉�(0); when 𝑟 
decreases, 𝑉�(1) will increase more than the increase of 𝑉�(0).   
 
Similarly,  
 
 
 
𝑑𝑉�(0)
𝑑𝑟
= − 1(1 + 𝑟)2 𝛽 �𝐸 � max𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)��,  
 
 
 and 𝑑𝑉�(1)𝑑𝑟 = − 1(1 + 𝑟)2 𝛽{𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)]}.  
 
When 𝐵 < 0 , that is, 𝐸�max𝑑2∈{0,1} 𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� < 𝐸[𝐵2(1,0;𝜋)] , we have 𝑑𝑉�(1)𝑑𝑟 <
𝑑𝑉�(0)
𝑑𝑟
< 0.  
Therefore, when 𝑟 increases, 𝑉�(1) will decrease more than the decrease of 𝑉�(0); when 𝑟 
decreases, 𝑉�(1) will increase more than the increase of 𝑉�(0). 
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Appendix 3 
 
According to Jensen’s Inequality (Mäler and Fisher, 2005), we know that, the expected 
value of a convex function of a random variable is no less than the convex function of the 
expected value of the random variable.  
 
The maximum function is a convex function. Therefore,  
 
 
 𝐸 � max𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)� − max𝑑2∈{0,1}𝐸[𝐵2(0,𝑑2;𝜋)] ≥ 0.  
 
 
 
 
 
